Delete checkpoints before removing business fields. Suppress only an
explicit CheckpointNotFoundError; propagate storage failures and
cancellation so the endpoint cannot report false success. Prefer async
checkpoint deletion and fail clearly when cleanup is unsupported.
Classify SSE error events as 401 for authentication, 429 for rate limits,
and 500 for other failures, using the same fixed messages as non-stream
responses. Errors terminate the stream without a success done event or
provider exception text in the response.
Validation: 286 offline tests passed (19 added), including failed-delete
HTTP retry with preserved business/checkpoint state, explicit missing
threads, cancellation, missing cleanup capability, and HTTP SSE errors
before and after text output.
LLM/output stage codes outside STATUS_CODE_MAP were passed through
silently with an empty nextStage - undetectable drift between the
prompt output code set and the endpoint mapping table.
- endpoints: _stage_label / _warn_unknown_stage_code helpers; both
streaming and non-streaming paths emit a warning with sessionId,
clientMode, raw and normalized codes when the label lookup misses
(transparency behavior unchanged: code passes through, label empty)
- known codes and covered internal normalizations (e.g. 2020->0002)
stay silent; the warning fires on the normalized value
Verified: 229 unit tests (4 new monitoring tests)
- fields_registry: 24 business keys in acd/human1/human2 groups with
value_type, writable and SensitiveLevel metadata; strict bool/int
parsing (no bool('0') trap); INTERNAL_FIELD_KEYS protection list
- repository: SessionRepository protocol + InMemorySessionRepository
(idempotent delete; PostgreSQL swap-in is assignment 7)
- AccidentAppService: chat/set_info/get_info/delete_session share one
business state - chat injects latest repository fields into the graph
and writes back validated field diffs; set/get/delete make zero LLM
calls and zero helper conversations (includeInputInfo accepted but
unused); unknown get keys keep the '' JSON-empty-string contract,
unknown set keys are rejected by whitelist
- ChatInput.injected_fields neutral contract extension; LangGraphBackend
merges injected fields into graph input (set_info visible next chat)
- endpoints: thin layer - langgraph mode routes business state through
the app service (fastgpt mode keeps the legacy path); delete cleans
repository + graph checkpoint, idempotent
- tests: registry completeness (sfzmwh/sjwh/csbw included), app service
combos with LLM-call spy, HTTP acceptance flow (set -> get -> chat ->
groups -> delete -> no leak, idempotent re-delete)
- docs/assignment6-compat.md: behavior diff list vs FastGPT status quo
and the audit backlog (arbitrary set_info key usage, stream formUpdate
write-back, sensitive-field display boundary)
Verified: 200 unit tests (172 existing + 28 new)
- Replaced direct FastGPT client usage with a backend-neutral chat interface, allowing for improved flexibility and maintainability.
- Introduced a new `ChatBackend` protocol and implemented `FastGPTBackend` to handle chat operations.
- Updated the chat endpoint to utilize the new backend structure, enhancing the handling of chat requests and responses.
- Added comprehensive tests to ensure compatibility and functionality of the new backend integration.
- Replaced hardcoded URLs with a base URL variable for better configurability.
- Updated request payloads to use sessionId and timeStamp variables.
- Enhanced the chat request with new parameters: needFormUpdate and useTextChunk.
- Adjusted response content types and lengths for consistency.
- Updated timestamps in response headers for accuracy.
- Changed ANALYSIS_SERVICE_URL to localhost for local development.
- Updated ANALYSIS_AUTH_TOKEN and APP_ID for improved security.
- Added new functions in endpoints.py for form extraction and stage code normalization.
- Enhanced chat handling to support form updates and improved event streaming.
- Updated models to include new fields for form update handling.
Eric Wang